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Abstract
The presence or absence of Principle A of the Binding Theory can be explained by a requirement at the
syntax semantics interface. Principle A effects surface in the presence of unmodified self, where there is
a requirement for the subject and object to be identical; this requirement triggers self -incorporation
into the predicate. In contrast, modified self -incorporation is blocked in the syntax, giving rise to
an asymmetric part-of relation. Given that self -incorporation is absent, we predict that Principle A
effects do not surface, and this is exactly what we find.
1 Introduction
1.1 The Puzzle
This paper explores the possibility of a uniform approach for the examples in (1) and (2). The English
data in (1) illustrate that anaphors are sensitive to Principle A of the Binding Theory, Chomsky
(1981), meaning that they require a local antecedent. It is debatable whether Principle A should be
expected to apply to the examples in (2).1 One could argue that in (2), his pathetic self is a noun
phrase where self is a noun, therefore subject to Condition C; whereas in (1), himself is an anaphor
and thus sensitive to Principle A.
(1) a. John saw himself (in the mirror) Sensitive to Principle A
b. *John knows that Maria saw himself (on the reality show)
(2) a. John saw his pathetic self (in the mirror) Not sensitive to Principle A
b. John knows that Maria saw his pathetic self (on the reality show)
Under such a view, self in English is lexically ambiguous,2 i.e. there are two lexical entries for self.
I will refer to the two constructions as unmodified self, (1), and modified self, (2). Assuming
lexical ambiguity implies that unmodified self in (1) and the presence of Principle A can be explained
by traditional Binding Theory, whereas in the modified self construction in (2), self refers to some
abstract aspect of the referent of his. It appears however, that the two occurrences of self in (1) and
1Natural occurrences of ‘his pathetic self’ (from Google):
(i) Let’s watch his pathetic self tread water for six hours.
(ii) Anyone who saw his pathetic self on his reality show knows that.
(iii) His ex wife im sure is so happy that she left his sorry pathetic loser self.
2Of course, treating English self as lexically ambiguous presupposes an analysis where himself is the spell-out of
the DP his self. Alternatively, himself and his . . . self may be classed as distinct items altogether.
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(2) share a core meaning, namely some notion of identity; therefore, a uniform approach is worth
pursuing.
Further support for a uniform approach comes from languages such as Greek (Greek) and Kutchi
Gujarati (KGu) (an Indo-Aryan language). In English, lexical ambiguity is motivated by the fact
that himself is morphologically distinct from his self, i.e. the form of the anaphor in (1) is not his
self. This distinction however, does not carry over to other languages. Unlike English, anaphora in
Greek and Kutchi Gujarati are morphologically complex. In these languages it is not immediately
obvious that self is lexically ambiguous, because both the unmodified self and the modified self
forms look identical apart from the presence or absence of the adjective (cf. (3b) and (4b) vs. (5b)
and (6b)). The Greek and Kutchi Gujarati data in (3) and (4), respectively, parallel the English
examples in (1). In all three languages the unmodified self must be locally bound and is sensitive
to Principle A.
(3) a. O Costasi vlepi [ton eaftoi tu]. Greek
Costasi sees det.m.sg selfi.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costasi sees himselfi.’
b. *O Costasi xeri oti Maria vlepi [ton eaftoi tu]. Greek
Costasi knows that Maria sees det.m.sg self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costasi knows that Maria sees himselfi.’
(4) a. johni [e-na pothai-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Johni 3.sg-gen selfi-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Johni saw himselfi.’
b. *johni kidthu ke maria [e-na pothai-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Johni said that Maria 3.sg-gen selfi-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Johni said that Maria saw himselfi.’
Identical to the English modified self example in (2), in Greek (5b) and Kutchi Gujarati (6b) the
presence of an adjective alters the acceptability of the utterance. While (5a)+(6a) with unmodified
self are ungrammatical, presumably due to Principle A, (5b)+(6b) with modified self are grammat-
ical, and have a reading where the mother loves the true part of the referent (Jannis in (5b) and
Valji in (6b)). Unlike English modified vs. unmodified self, the Greek and Kutchi Gujarati examples
in (3a)+(5b) and (4a)+(6b), respectively, show that the forms of modified self and unmodified self
are identical (eafto in Greek, and potha-ne in Kutchi Gujarati).
(5) a. *[I mitera tu Jannii] agapai [ton eaftoi tu]. Greek
3.f.sg.nom mother Jannii.gen loves 3.m.sg.acc selfi 3.m.sg.gen
‘Jannisi’s mother loves his selfi.’
b. [I mitera tu Jannii] agapai [ton alithino eaftoi tu]. Greek
3.f.sg.nom mother Jannii.gen loves 3.m.sg.acc true selfi 3.m.sg.gen
‘Jannisi’s mother loves his true selfi.’
(6) a. *valjii-ni ma [e-na pothai-ne] prem kar-e. KGu
Valjii-gen.f mother 3.sg-gen selfi-acc love do-3.sg
‘Valjii’s mother loves his selfi.’
b. valjii-ni ma [e-na sacha pothai-ne] prem kar-e. KGu
Valjii-gen.f mother 3.sg-gen true selfi-acc love do-3.sg
‘Valjii’s mother loves his true selfi.’
There is a question at this point whether modified self may be a type of logophor, i.e. a pronominal
element that refers to the ‘source of information’ (Bu¨ring 2005:62) for the environment that it
occurs in. It can be easily shown that this is not the case. In the Kutchi Gujarati example in (7),
the embedded clause ‘she saw his true self’ is embedded under a verb of saying, kidthu ‘said’ with
Mary as its subject. If ena sacha pothane ‘his true self’ was a logophor in this example, then its only
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possible antecedent would be Mary, as the source of information. However, eno sacho pothane can
refer to John’s true self, which shows that it is not a logophor.
(7) johni avyo. mary kidthu ke i [e-na sacha pothai-ne] jo-yo. KGu
John came Mary said that 3.sg 3.sg-gen true selfi-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Johni came. Mary said that she saw his true selfi.’
Given the facts discussed in this section, it seems worth pursuing a view where there is simply one,
non-lexically ambiguous self (at least for Greek and Kutchi Gujarati). Such an approach raises the
following question: if unmodified self in Greek and Kutchi Gujarati is sensitive to Principle A, why
does this effect vanish in the case of modified self ? I will argue that the Principle A effects do not
arise directly from the semantics of self (in the sense that there are two lexical entries), but rather
from the structural configuration and syntactic environment where self is situated, in combination
with interface requirements.
1.2 Overview of the Solution
In order to explain the peculiar distribution of unmodified and modified self with respect to Principle
A, I propose that the lexical entry for self in these languages denotes a relation R, which I assume is
equivalent to something along the lines of part-of (defined in section 2.2.2). I argue that this part-of
relation can pick out different aspects of an individual e.g., the evil side of someone’s personality as
well as the good side of that person’s personality.
Furthermore, I argue that the difference between modified and unmodified self arises due to a
requirement at the syntax-semantics interface; unmodified self would be too unconstrained if it
simply expresses the part-of relation (because there are potentially infinitely many aspects of an
individual3).
(8) unconstrained meaning of self as part-of (to be discarded)
John saw himself (in the mirror).
≈ John saw the unique salient part of John (in the mirror).
This requirement (which militates against (8)) is implemented by assuming that unmodified self
differs from modified self due to predicate incorporation of self in the former, (9), but not in the
latter, (10). While the part-of relation is asymmetric, self -incorporation gives rise to a symmetric
relation, as self is interpreted both in its base position and in its landing position, thus reversing
the arguments; this constrains the interpretation of unmodified self. In contrast, modified self -
configurations are cases where the anaphor cannot incorporate (due to independent constraints in
the syntax), allowing the relation expressed by self to remain asymmetric. Furthermore, I will show
that self -incorporation not only yields a symmetric relation, but also requires identity of the subject
and object, triggering Principle A effects. In contrast, when incorporation is blocked (the cases of
modified self ), the anaphor is exempt from Principle A.
(9) unmodified self
John saw himself (in the mirror).
=⇒ John self-saw himself (in the mirror).
≈ John is a part of the unique salient part of John and John saw the unique salient part of
John (in the mirror).
= John saw John (in the mirror).
(10) modified self
John saw his pathetic self.
≈ John saw the unique salient entity that is pathetic and a part of John.
3I will show that an approach where default interpretation of ‘the unique salient part’ as ‘the part that corresponds
to the whole’ cannot be the correct one.
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2 The Semantics of self
In this section, I propose a uniform semantics for modified and unmodified self. In section 2.1, I
present a simplified version of the lexical entry for self, which reduces the relation between the
arguments to identity. Although this explains unmodified self, section 2.2 shows that the lexical
entry is too conservative and fails to account for the empirical scope regarding modified self. I
propose an alternative lexical entry that relaxes the identity relation replacing it with the part-of
relation in section 2.3. I illustrate that such an approach can uniformly account for both modified
and unmodified self.
2.1 The Semantics of Unmodified self
The utterances in (11a) and (11b) intuitively correspond to a meaning similar to Costas admires
Costas and Valji saw Valji, respectively. On a par with Iatridou (1988), and Anagnostopoulou &
Everaert (1999), I assume that eafto ‘self’ (and potha ‘self’) is the head of a complex DP containing
a true determiner ton ‘the’ (which takes the shape of the differential object marker ne in Kutchi
Gujarati), as well as a bound genitive pronoun tu ‘his’ (and ena ‘his’). To derive the correct truth
conditions, I propose that the counterparts of self in Greek and Kutchi Gujarati are relational nouns,
and that self denotes identity between its arguments.4 Under such an analysis of self as expressing
the identity relation, eafto’s first argument in (11a) is the bound genitive pronoun tu, and its second
argument is bound by the iota operator introduced by the determiner ton. The resulting meaning is
Costas admires the unique individual identical to Costas, which is trivially synonymous with Costas
admires Costas.
(11) a. O Costas2 thavmazi [dp ton [ eafto tu2]]. Greek
Costas admires det.m.sg self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costas admires himself.’
b. valji2 [e-na2 potha-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Valji saw himself.’
Formally speaking, given that self in these languages seems to express identity, we can assume the
preliminary lexical entry given in (12): A function that takes two arguments and yields the truth
value 1 iff the two arguments are identical.
(12) the semantics of ‘eafto/potha (self)’ (preliminary)5
||eafto/potha|| = [λx.λy.y = x]
To derive the syntactic distribution of Principle A, I argue that unmodified self obligatorily
incorporates into the matrix verb (see (14b) for an illustration), unless blocked by independent
syntactic constraints.6 For the purposes of the present section, it suffices to state the following.
In order to derive the correct truth conditions for the utterance, I assume that both copies of
self are interpreted. Fox (1999, 2002) proposes that higher copies are interpreted as operators and
lower copies as variables. Given his explanation of Principle C effects in quantifier raising (qr), his
findings suggest that we have reason to believe that copies are interpreted in every merge position
modulo semantic convergence.7 In order to interpret the higher copy of self, we need a new predicate
modification rule, given in (13). In order for eafto/potha (being of type <e,<e,t>>) to combine with
4See Saxon (1984), Lubowicz (1999), and Gast (2006) for the idea that self -forms generally express identity
functions.
5This analysis of Kutchi Gujarati potha and Greek eafto as relational nouns that denote the identity function was
first proposed in Patel (2010:6); the adaptation of predicate modification for relational predicates was first given in
Patel (2010:13). For Greek eaftos, the same proposal was made in parallel by Spathas (2010:161-162).
6See Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (1999), Reuland (2001, 2005, 2011) and Reuland & Winter (2009) for predeces-
sors of this approach.
7Cf. For Fox (1999, 2002), interpreting both copies is more economical than interpreting one. There does not seem
to be a principled reason why we should not be able to interpret both copies as they are, if this yields a well-formed
interpretation.
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a transitive verb (also of type <e,<e,t>>), I assume that predicate modification can be extended
(from combining two functions of type <e,t> to combining two functions of type <e,<e,t>>). Put
differently, predicate modification for relational predicates contains sets of ordered pairs, and is a
relation that holds between two things.
(13) Predicate Modification for Relational Predicates
For any β and γ, which are functions of type <e,<e,t>>, and assignment g,
|| β γ ||g = [λx.λy. || β ||g(x)(y) = 1 & || γ ||g(x)(y) = 1].
(based on Heim & Kratzer 1998:95)
Compositionally, we can now derive the meaning of a construction containing a reflexive DP; this
is illustrated in (14) for Kutchi Gujarati.8 Note that for ease of exposition, I use Bu¨ring’s (2005) β
operator,9 which does not require movement of the binder.
(14) a. valji2 [e-na2 potha-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Valji saw himself.’
b. LF: Valji2 [ena2 potha-ne] potha-joyo.
c. ||S||gt
= 1 iff Valji = ız [z = Valji] & Valji saw ız [z = Valji]
||Valji||ge ||VP||
g
<e,t>
= Valji = [λb.b = ız [z = b] & b saw ız [z = b]]
β2 ||VP||
g
<e,t>
= [λy.y = ız [z = g(2)] & y saw ız [z = g(2)]]
||DP||ge ||V||
g
<e,<e,t>>
= ız [z = g(2)] = [λx.λy.y = x & y saw x]
||potha||g<e<e,t>> ||joyo||
g
<e,<e,t>>
= [λx.λy.y = x] = [λx.λy.y saw x]
||NP||g<e,t> ||-ne||
g
<<e,t>,e>
= [λy.y = g(2)] = [λP<e,t> : ∃!u [P(u) = 1] . ız [P(z) = 1]]
||ena2||ge ||potha||
g
<e,<e,t>>
= g(2) = [λx.λy.y = x]
d. In words: Valji equals the unique individual (in the utterance context) that equals Valji
and Valji saw the unique individual that is equal to Valji.
The syntax-semantic analysis sketched above is appealing for various reasons. First, having shown
how to derive the truth conditions for sentences with self -incorporation that satisfy Principle A, we
can now turn to examples that violate Principle A, illustrated in (15).
(15) a. *O Costasi xeri oti Maria vlepi [ton eaftoi tu]. Greek
Costasi knows that Maria sees det.m.sg self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costasi knows that Maria sees himselfi.’
8The semantic analysis proposed here also accounts for the equivalent Greek data, and derives identical truth
conditions to the Kutchi Gujarati case. In this example, I analyze the differential object marker -ne as an element
that contributes the meaning of the definite determiner; however, this is a simplification, since -ne is known to interact
with various factors, including animacy, definiteness and specificity, cf. Butt and Ahmed (2011), Mistry (1997).
9Bu¨ring’s (2005:85) Binder Index Evaluation Rule (bier) is defined as follows:
(i) For any natural number n, || βn Y||g = λb.||Y||g[b/n](b).
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b. *johni kidthu ke maria [e-na pothai-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Johni said that Maria 3.sg-gen selfi-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Johni said that Maria saw himselfi.’
The above analysis derives the following truth conditions given in (16) for these examples.
(16) a. LF: ||O Costasi xeri oti Maria eafto-vlepi [ton eaftoi tu]|| Greek
‘Costasi knows that Maria self-sees himselfi’
= 1 iff Costas knows that [Maria equals the unique individual that equals Costas and Maria
sees the unique individual that is equal to Costas].
b. LF: || Johni kidthu ke Maria [e-na pothai-ne] potha-joyo || KGu
‘Johni said that Maria self-saw himselfi’
= 1 iff John said that [Maria equals the unique individual that equals John and Maria saw
the unique individual that is equal to John].
Since it is part of the truth conditions that Maria is identical to whoever the reflexive refers
to, these statements will be false whenever Maria is not identical to the referent of himself (given
that the identity of Maria and himself is part of the truth conditions). The ill-formedness of these
examples then arises from the fact that the intended reading is one where Costas/John is the referent
of himself. Costas/John and Maria can only both be co-referent with himself if Costas/John and
Maria refer to the same person (i.e. Costas/John = Maria).
One of the consequences of the analysis, which must be addressed, is why modified self is exempt
from Principle A; this is the topic of section 2.2. We address unmodified self in section 2.3.
2.2 The Semantics of Modified self
2.2.1 Problems with Identity
It follows from the proposal in the previous section, that given identity, a subject and object must be
identical whenever the object contains self, and self is incorporated into the predicate. However, it
can be shown that once self is modified by an adjective, treating the anaphors in Greek and Kutchi
Gujarati as identity relations will not do.
Consider the following scenario. I use English for simplicity, though the same argument applies
to Kutchi Gujarati and Greek. Assume that there are two sides to John’s personality. John has an
attractive self and an ugly self. I can now say John admires his attractive self and fears his ugly
self, and the use of this utterance in such a way avoids any form of contradiction. If the anaphors
in question were to require the subject and object to be identical, it is not clear how this could be
implemented for this scenario; how could John’s attractive self be identical to John, when John also
encompasses an ugly self?
Or, what is more worrying: If John’s attractive self was identical to John, and John’s ugly self
was identical to John, then John’s attractive self would be identical to (and indistinguishable from)
John’s ugly self. This is clearly an undesirable result. For instance, we can make a statement like
(17a), to give an extreme case. Let us assume that a modified self construction does not involve
self -incorporation, given that modified self is not subject to Principle A (I will derive this from
independent syntactic constraints in section 3). Assuming (which might be a simplification here,10
see also section 2.2.2) that attractive and ugly are intersective adjectives, we would derive truth
conditions as in (17b). Given the nature of identity, the only individual that is equal to John is John
himself. The truth conditions in (17b) thus wrongly predict that (17a) is equivalent to (18a), (18b)
and (18c), which in turn should all be equivalent.
(17) a. [John’s attractive self] fears [his ugly self]
b. ||(17a)|| = 1 iff [the unique individual that is attractive and equals John] fears [the unique
individual that is ugly and equals John]
10This simplification should not have consequences for the point that I am making. If attractive and ugly are
subsective, John’s attractive self would still be a self of John’s. Therefore, if self expresses identity, the same argument
would hold.
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(18) a. John fears himself.
b. [John’s attractive self] fears itself.
c. [John’s ugly self] fears itself.
As (18a), (18b), (18c) and (17a) do not have the same meaning, self in modified self constructions
cannot denote the identity function.11 Given these examples, it is appropriate to relax the meaning
of self. I argue that in the cases where incorporation occurs and the subject and object are identical,
the relation between the two arguments is not strict identity, but simply an illusion of identity, which
I formalize more precisely in section 2.2.2.
2.2.2 Analyzing Modified self
Given that strict identity is problematic for the modified self cases, in this section I argue that
a less conservative lexical entry for self is required. In the remainder of this paper, I argue for a
single lexical entry for self given in (19), that consists of a part-of relation. I will show that the
compositional semantics for modified and unmodified self are different, despite the fact that they
make use of the same lexical entry. This is motivated by the fact that the semantic relations present
in the modified and unmodified self cases (after computing the meaning of the entire clause) are not
the same. (Strict identity in the case of unmodified self as opposed to a relaxed part-of relation in
the case of modified self ). I begin by laying out the foundations of my proposal, and I then illustrate
its application to the modified self cases. I show that the proposed analysis accounts for the different
classes of adjectives that combine with self. In the section that follows, I argue that crucially, the
unmodified self examples can all be derived if we relax the semantics in this manner. Furthermore,
I argue that the semantic unification of the two types of self gives rise to the differences present in
the syntax (presence vs. absence of self -incorporation, which in turn give rise to the presence vs.
absence of Principle A).
(19) The meaning of ‘self ’ (first sketch)
a. ||self || = λx.λy.y bears R to x Asymmetric
b. ||self|| = λx.λy. R(y, x) Symmetric
In order to explain the modified self examples in Greek and Kutchi Gujarati, I argue that the
meaning of the utterance can be derived if we assume that one argument, say x, is a part of the
second argument, y, however the argument y is not a part of the argument x. By assuming such an
asymmetric relation, we derive a meaning as sketched in (20).
(20) ||John saw his . . . self|| = 1 iff John saw ız . R (z, John)
and it is possible that not R (John, z)
In (20), I assume that a definite determiner combines with self, namely ton in Greek and –ne in
Kutchi Gujarati, which picks out the unique, salient individual that is in relation R to the possessor
pronoun bound by John. If we add adjectival modifiers to (20), they serve to further specify this
individual.
The Greek12 and Kutchi Gujarati data in (21)–(24) show that there are three types of adjectives
(intersective, non-intersective but subsective, and non-subsective but privative) that can modify
self.13
11This problem is not restricted to a particular class of adjectives, but applies to all of the classes of adjectives that
can combine with the anaphor.
12Greek speakers find these modified self cases acceptable but slightly marked. Naturally occurring examples appear
in Google; thanks to Dimitris Michelioudakis (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
13See Partee (2007) for diagnosing adjective classes. The only class of adjective that cannot modify self in Greek
and Kutchi Gujarati is plain non-subsective. It is not immediately clear why this particular class of adjective cannot
combine with anaphors; this is not predicted by this analysis.
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Intersective
(21) a. O Costas idhe ton arosto eafto tu (ston kathrefti). Greek
Costas saw det.m.sg sick self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen in.the mirror
‘Costas saw his sick self (in the mirror).’
b. valji e-no bimar potha-ne jo-yo. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen.m sick self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Valji saw his sick self.’
Non-intersective, subsective
(22) a. O Costas idhe ton sinithi eafto tu. Greek
Costas saw det.m.sg usual/typical self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costas saw his usual/typical self.’
b. valji e-no thik thak potha-ne jo-yo. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen.m usual/typical self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Valji saw his usual/typical self.’
Non-subsective, privative
(23) a. Costas idhe ton fandastiko eafto tu. Greek
Costas saw det.m.sg imaginary self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costas saw his imaginary self.’
b. valji e-na khota potha-ne jo-yo. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen imaginary self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Valji saw his imaginary self.’
Plain non-subsective
(24) O Costas idhe ton ?*dhinitiko / *endhechomeno eafto tu. Greek
Costas saw the potential / potential-contingent self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costas saw his potential self.’14
In order to explain the first class, namely intersective adjectives, identity (as discussed in the previous
section) alone would suffice, as long as we focus on a fixed point in time. For instance, if I am sick
right now, and I utter the following: I see my sick self in the mirror, an analysis in terms of identity
would yield the meaning that I see the unique salient individual in the mirror that is identical to
me, and sick. This would be a true statement. However something more needs to be said in order to
account for subsective and privative adjective examples. Clearly, John’s better self (where better is
subsective) would not be identical to John (even at a fixed point in time), and John’s former self or
John’s imaginary self (former and imaginary being privative) would also not be identical to John.
The core of the idea that I have alluded to earlier in this section is that the relation between the
two arguments is equivalent to an asymmetric notion meaning something along the lines of part-
of;15 a is a part of b; however, b is not necessarily a part of a. The specific definition of the relation
between the two arguments in (25) is not trivial, and I will dedicate the reminder of this section
to pinning it down. I will then illustrate the application of the proposal to the non-intersective but
sub-sective adjective class.
(25) ||John saw his . . . self|| = 1 iff John saw ız . R (z, John)
and it is possible that not R (John, z)
Certain classes of adjectives make reference to various points in the individual’s life, e.g., former
self, current self, whereas other adjectives may make references to co-existing aspects of an individual
14The Kutchi Gujarati equivalent is not possible here, for possible is not an adjective, but a complex verb which
cannot combine with self.
15This relation picks out psychological aspects of the individual, for example if John painted himself blue, looked
in the mirror and said ‘I saw my blue self’, the only possible reading in Greek and Kutchi Gujarati is that John saw
his sad/depressed self.
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at a set point in time (e.g., cynical self, idealistic self). We must first establish the concept of the
individual that the denotation of self selects a part of (i.e. the internal argument of self ), before
turning to the relation between the two arguments of self. I will refer to this individual as the host
individual;16 for every individual, there is a corresponding host individual. The host individual
is the collection of all temporal stages17 of an individual, and the collection of all physical and
psychological aspects of that individual at any temporal stage. In other words, the host individual
is equal to the individual in their entirety, temporally, physically and psychologically at each point
throughout their existence. However, a host individual, encompassing all aspects of an individual,
can be underspecified with respect to certain of its properties; for example, a host individual can be
both good and bad, but (naturally) not simultaneously.
The host individual will allow the denotation of self to select a part of it, where a part is defined
as follows: In line with Carlson (1977) and Lewis (1983), I assume that at a fixed temporal point
and in a fixed world, a synchronic part of a host individual is related to the host individual in the
following way. First, the part of the host individual is specified more than the host individual for one
or more properties. Second, the part of the host individual does not differ from the host individual in
any other way. To illustrate, assume that the host individual δ1 corresponds to a person, Dan, who
can be good, but can also be bad (but not both simultaneously); i.e. δ1 has the property of being
good or bad — and δ1 is not further specified. A part µ of δ1 may make a selection in this regard.
Dan’s good self (or µg) might be good and not bad, whereas Dan’s bad self (or µb) might be bad and
not good. Naturally, these may entail further selections — for instance, Dan’s good self might also be
idealistic and not cynical whereas Dan’s bad self might be cynical and not idealistic. Again, δ1 would
be underspecified, i.e. δ1 would be cynical or idealistic. The crucial point is that apart from being
specified more than δ1, all of its parts (e.g., µg and µb) are identical to δ1; this derives non-identity
under near-identity (i.e. my good self feels identical to me in some loose sense even though it is not).
Every part of a host individual is a part of a host individual at some set point (or more) throughout
the individual’s existence, e.g., the part of an individual’s personality that is evil, the part of their
personality that is fair etc. all surface at separate points in time. This will be crucial for explaining
the non-identity cases. Now that the part of relation, which I argue to hold between the two
arguments of self has been specified, I return to the various classes of adjectives that may combine
with self. We can first define the lexical entry in (26), based on the above discussion.
(26) ||self|| = λx.λy. y is a part of x
Naturally, there is an interaction between time and parts of a host individual (e.g., if John was
innocent in the past, we might say I admired John’s innocent self, but he may no longer be innocent
and never become innocent again). To simplify, I focus on cases where the relevant part of the
individual exists at the same time at which the event or state denoted by the predicate exists. For
example, consider John saw his good self; the part of John that is good, must be present in the
timeframe in which John carried out the act of seeing this good part of him, cf. Musan (1999). To
illustrate my semantic analysis for the comparatively simple cases, I will first discuss the intersective
and subsective class. At a fixed point in time t, the data in (27) can be treated as intersective if
John is sick, given that at this point in time t John in his entirety is sick.
(27) a. john e-na bimar potha-ne jo-yo. KGu
John 3.sg-gen sick self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘John saw his sick self (in the mirror).’
b. O Costas idhe ton arosto eafto tu ston kathrefti. Greek
Costas saw det.m.sg sick self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen in.the mirror
‘Costas saw his sick self (in the mirror).’
16I inherit the term host individual from Musan (1999).
17Stages are temporal parts or slices of the individual, cf. Quine (1960), Carlson (1977). A stage can be any length
that is included in its host individual’s time of existence.
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I assume that bimar ‘sick’ combines with potha ‘self’ by means of predicate modification, as is
usually assumed for intersective adjectives (though the first argument slot of potha ‘self’ needs to
be filled first, e.g., by John in (29)). Thus, based on the meaning of potha ‘self’ in (26), the relevant
lexical entries and truth conditions associated with bimar potha ‘sick self’ are given in (28) and
(29), respectively. The lexical entry shows that in the intersective case (29), the unique individual
in object position (in this case a part of John that may be identical to the host individual John) is
sick.
(28) a. ||potha/eafto/self|| = λx.λy. y is a part of x
b. ||bimar/arosto/sick|| = λx.x is sick
(29) a. ||John saw his self|| = 1 iff John saw ız . z is a part of John
b. ||John saw his sick self|| = 1 iff John saw ız, z is sick and z is a part of John
The privative class of adjectives, as illustrated in (30) and (31) is not as straightforward as the
subsective and intersective classes, for we need to assume that the host individual can be segmented
according to temporal slices (for (30)) and that we can talk about parts of the host individual
that exist in worlds other than the real world (for (31)).
(30) a. john e-na pelano potha-ne nafrat kar-e. KGu
John 3.sg-gen former self-acc hate do-3.sg
‘John hates his former self.’
b. O Costas misos ton proigoumenos eafto tu. Greek
Costas hates det.m.sg former self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costas hates his former self.’
(31) a. john e-na khota potha-ne prem kar-e. KGu
John 3.sg-gen imaginary self-acc love do-3.sg
‘John loves his imaginary self.’
b. O Costas agapai ton fandastiko eafto tu. Greek
Costas loves det.m.sg imaginary self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costas loves his imaginary self.’
A temporal slice is a stage of a host individual at a fixed point in time. A host individual exists at
different stages of time. For any stage of time, the temporal slice of a host individual at a particular
stage of time is an individual that is identical to all of what the individual is at a particular stage
of time. Temporal slices interact with parts of a host individual, for example, John at age 7 may
have a part that is innocent (but no part that is mature), whereas John at age 28 may no longer
have such an innocent part (and only a part that is mature). In this case, the host individual in its
entirety has an innocent part as well as a mature part, but both are temporally bound; the innocent
part to the earlier time slices of John and the mature part to the later time slices of John.
Turning to the meaning of his former self, we need to introduce a time argument for self, illustrated
in (32a); self can then combine with former, as defined in (32b), adapted from von Fintel & Heim
(2010:69). (I differ from von Fintel & Heim in assuming that t is of type l.) As shown in (32c), we
derive the correct truth conditions for John hates his former self, namely that John hates some part
(or all) of what he was at some point in the past, but what he is no longer.
(32) a. ||potha/eafto/self||t = λx.λy. y is a part of x at t
b. ||pelano/proigoumenos/former||t = λf<l,<e,t>>.λx.[f(t)(x) = 0 & ∃t’ before t: f(t’)(x) = 1]
c. ||John hates his former self||t = 1 iff John hates ız . z is not a part of John at t &
∃t’ before t: z is a part of John at t’
Having accounted for (30), let us move on to (31). Although khota potha ‘imaginary self’ is a
privative adjective, it is not enough to simply apply the analysis for pelano ‘former’; something more
is required. The problem is that John’s imaginary self can refer to an individual that only exists
in John’s dreams and does not exist at any point in time in the real world. In this sense, John’s
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imaginary self may not be part of the host individual John in the real world. If, however, we relativize
self to possible worlds,18 we can analyze this on analogy to pelano ‘former’. I provide a rough sketch
in (33), assuming that the person whose imagination khoto ‘imaginary’ refers to, is provided by the
context (as indicated in (33b)), and resolved towards John in (33c). The truth conditions in (33c)
correctly capture the fact that John loves his imaginary self is true in a situation where John believes
that he is a hero (even though he is not), and John loves the hero that he thinks he is.
(33) a. ||potha/eafto/self||w = λx.λy. y is a part of x in w
b. ||khoto/fandastiko/imaginary||w = λf<s,<e,t>>.λx.[f(w)(x) = 0 & ∀w’ compatible with the
day dreams of some salient individual y: f(w’)(x) = 1]
c. ||John loves his imaginary self||w = 1 iff John loves ız . z is not a part of John in w &
∀w’ compatible with the day dreams of John:
z is a part of John in w’
The question remains why his alleged self or his putative self (with plain non-subsective adjec-
tives) seem to be impossible (crosslinguistically); the semantic analysis would predict these to be
acceptable. At this stage, it is not clear how to account for this apparent gap.
2.3 Unifying Unmodified & Modified self
In the previous section, we saw that relaxing the identity relation allowed us to derive the correct
truth conditions for modified self. In this section, we will see that the proposed semantics from
the previous section carries over to the cases that appear to exhibit identity. In order to account
for these cases, I assume that the relation between the arguments becomes symmetric due to the
incorporation of self. Before presenting this analysis, it is worth discussing an alternative approach
to deriving identity from the part-of relation. I argue that this alternative faces problems that my
analysis does not.
Take the above analysis, supported by native speaker intuitions regarding modified self in Greek
and Kutchi Gujarati (self picks out a particular part of the individual, rather then the individual in
their entirety). It seems appropriate to assume that the maximal part of an individual in the absence
of an adjective (i.e. in the case of unmodified self ) is by default the individual in its entirety, which
may be most salient. Thus, in both the modified and unmodified self cases, the part of the individual
that is picked out could be explained in terms of saliency. In the example John’s sick self, the most
salient part of John is selected that counts as sick, whereas in the case of himself, the host individual
of the referent (him) is selected in its entirety.
Although such a view is plausible, this line of enquiry seems empirically incorrect. Consider the
following scenarios. If we assume that himself refers to a maximal, salient part of the individual
selected by him (rather than necessarily the entire individual), one possible reading that should be
available for (34) is one where John likes his dark self (which would be the most salient part of
John’s). However, (34) only seems to have the reading where John likes John (as an individual, in
his entirety).
(34) After discovering John’s dark self last weekend, I’m surprised that he likes himself.
Similarly, the anaphor himself should fail to refer to a particular part of John (including the maximal
part that corresponds to John in his entirety) if several parts of John are made salient, as in (35a).
We find such an effect in (35b), where the referent of his dog cannot be resolved easily (though
resolution to the closest antecedent may be an option). However, in (35a), such an effect is absent.
The final sentence clearly means John nevertheless likes John (in his entirety), even though this is
not the most salient part of John and in fact there is no unique most salient part of John in this
utterance.
(35) a. There are many sides to John. He clearly has a good self, he cares about others, he wants
18Of course, once we relativize potha ‘self’ to worlds and times, the world and time parameter will always be present,
but for simplicity, I only write them as and when they are needed.
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to do things morally, etc. At the same time, his psychotic self always takes over when he’s
stressed, and his greedy self takes over when large amounts of money are involved. John is
aware that he has issues, but he nevertheless likes himself.
b. John owns a small kennel. He has a cute, well-behaved dog. He also has a psychotic dog
that attacks people, and a timid dog that always hides. ?? Nevertheless, he’s happy and he
likes his dog.
To account for identity with unmodified self, I propose (as outlined already in section 2.1) that
unmodified self undergoes incorporation of the anaphor into the predicate, and that the anaphor
is interpreted twice, reversing the order of the predicates. While this was irrelevant in section 2.1,
identity being symmetric, it has an impact in the present case, as it compositionally yields x is a
part of y and y is a part of x, thereby turning the part-of relation into a symmetric relation. Put
differently, in (36a), the meaning of the DP ena potha-ne is the unique individual that is a part of
Valji. By interpreting potha twice and combining it with the meaning of the predicate, the meaning of
the VP ena potha-ne (potha-)joyo is a conjunction between being a part of the unique individual that
is a part of Valji and seeing the unique individual that is a part of Valji. The LF for an example such
as valji ena potha–ne joyo ‘Valji saw himself’ is given in (36b), the complete derivation is illustrated
in (36c).
(36) a. valji2 [e-na2 potha-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Valji saw himself.’
b. LF: Valji2 [ena2 potha-ne] potha-joyo.
c.
||S||gt
= 1 iff [Valji is a part of ız [z is a part of Valji] &
Valji saw ız [z is a part of Valji]]
||Valji||ge ||VP||
g
<e,t>
= Valji = [λb.b is a part of ız [z is a part of b] &
b saw ız [z is a part of b]]
β2 ||VP||
g
<e,t>
= [λy.y is a part of ız [z is a part of g(2)] &
y saw ız [z is a part of g(2)]]
||DP||ge ||V||
g
<e,<e,t>>
= ız [z is a part of g(2)] = [λx.λy.y is a part of x & y saw x]
||potha||g<e,<e,t>> ||joyo||
g
<e,<e,t>>
= [λx.λy.y is a part of x] = [λx.λy.y saw x]
||NP||g<e,t> ||-ne||
g
<<e,t>,e>
= [λy.y is a part of g(2)] = [λP<e,t> : ∃!u [P(u) = 1] . ız [P(z) = 1]]
||ena2 ||ge ||potha||
g
<e,<e,t>>
= g(2) = [λx.λy.y is a part of x]
d. In words: Valji is a part of the unique individual (in the utterance context) that is a part
of Valji and Valji saw the unique individual that is a part of Valji.
Due to self -incorporation (which leads to assertion of ‘Valji is a part of ız [z is a part of Valji]’),
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identity between the subject and the object is established in the grammar. In other words, even
though the part-of relation is not symmetric, self -incorporation creates a symmetric relation between
the two arguments. This derives both identity and Principle A effects with unmodified self.
Conversely, in the case of modified self, self -incorporation would lead to an incorrect interpreta-
tion. Consider the following scenario: Costas has a pitiful side, but he also has an over-confident side,
both of which he shows at different times. As a matter of fact, he admires not only his over-confident
side, but also his pitiful side. In this scenario, (37) may be uttered. If self -incorporation took place
here, we would get the meaning in (38a), which incorrectly entails (38b); the correct reading is de-
rived without self -incorporation, this is given in (39). This is compatible with the assumption that
there is no self -incorporation with modified self.
(37) O Costas thavmazi [ton aksiolipito eafto tu]. Greek
Costas admires det.m.sg pitiful self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costas admires his pitiful self.’
(38) ||O Costas thavmazi ton aksiolipito eafto tu]||
a. = 1 iff Costas is a part of ız [z is pitiful & z is a part of Costas]
& Costas admires ız [z is pitiful & z is a part of Costas]] incorrect
b. entails: Costas (in his entirety) is pitiful.
(39) ||O Costas thavmazi ton aksiolipito eafto tu]||
a. = 1 iff Costas admires ız [z is pitiful & z is a part of Costas]] correct
b. does not entail: Costas (in his entirety) is pitiful.
Since modified self does not involve self -incorporation, we now derive the absence of Principle A
effects, e.g., in (40a), which has the LF in (40b) and derivation in (40c). (Note that in (40), the
pronoun ena must reconstruct to a position adjacent to potha ‘self’, since it is interpreted as the first
argument of the relational noun phrase potha ‘self’.)
(40) a. valjii-ni ma [e-na sacha pothai-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Valjii-gen.f mother 3.sg-gen true selfi-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Valjii’s mother saw his true selfi.’
b. LF: [Valji2-ni ma] [sacha ena2 potha-ne] joyo.
c.
||S||gt
= 1 iff [λx [x is a mother of Valji] saw ız [z is true & z is a part of g(2)]]
= 1 iff [λx [x is a mother of Valji] saw ız [z is true & z is a part of Valji]]
||Valji-ni ma||ge ||VP||
g
<e,t>
= λx [x is a mother of Valji] = [λy.y saw ız [z is true & z is a part of g(2)]]
||DP||ge ||joyo||
g
<e,<e,t>>
= ız [z is true & z is a part of g(2)] = [λx.λy.y saw x]
||NP||g<e,t> ||-ne||
g
<<e,t>,e>
= [λx.x is true & x is a part of g(2)] = [λP<e,t> : ∃!u [P(u) = 1] . ız [P(z) = 1]]
||sacha||g<e,t> ||NP||
g
<e,t>
= [ız.z is true] = [λy.y is a part of g(2)]
||ena2||ge ||potha||
g
<e,<e,t>>
= g(2) = [λx.λy.y is a part of x]
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d. In words: Valji’s mother saw the unique individual (in the utterance context) that is true
and that is a part of Valji.
The structure and derivation of valji-ni ma ‘Valji’s mother’ is given separately in (41) for reasons of
space. Here, ma ‘mother’ is assumed to be a relational noun, which takes Valji as its first argument.
In subject position, definiteness is not overtly marked, but by analogy to the definiteness marking in
object position (due to the differential object marker –ne), I assume that definiteness is introduced
by a null marker, as indicated.
(41) ||DP||ge
= ız [z is a mother of Valji]
||NP||g<e,t> || ∅ ||
g
<<e,t>,e>
= [λy.y is a mother of Valji] = [λP<e,t> : ∃!u [P(u) = 1] . ız [P(z) = 1]]
||Valji-ni||ge ||ma||
g
<e,<e,t>>
= Valji = [λx.λy.y is a mother of x]
We can now make a stronger claim to motivate self -incorporation in the case of unmodified self, but
not in the case of modified self. Given that self selects a part of a host individual and the individual
in its entirety does not seem to be available as a default maximal part (cf. (34) and (35)), himself
(without self -incorporation) would be radically underspecified at any given point in time.
Even more problematic, as we can see in (42a-c), the part-of relation can pick out something that
existed in the past and something that will exist in the future. Finally, it is possible to modify the
part-of relation explicitly to pick out individuals in their entirety, (42d).
(42) a. In the moral sphere, I make decisions and count on my future self to carry them out.
(www.ucs.mun.ca/ davidt/Intuition.htm)
=⇒ my future self refers to an individual that does not yet exist
b. Although GD is now ‘hardcore’, I still miss his innocent self. When he was with Big Bang,
he was so cute.
(http://sookyeong.wordpress.com/2009/12/07/gdragons-concert-pinned-with-controversies/)
=⇒ his innocent self refers to an individual that no longer exists
c. Schumacher kept smiling, kept giving non-committal answers . . . and kept driving like a
shadow of his former self.
(www.itv-f1.com/Controller.aspx?PO ID=49236)
=⇒ his former self refers to an individual that no longer exists
d. If he did not receive a glowing review from the boss over his last presentation, the Perfec-
tionist sees it as a failure of his entire self.
(therapyinphiladelphia.com/selfhelp/tips/is it low self esteem/)
=⇒ his entire self possibly refers to a complete host individual
The question would thus arise, which part of a host individual unmodified self refers to, if it still
expresses the part-of relation. As indicated in (43), himself typically picks out an entire host individ-
ual at the point in time that the predicate holds at. self -incorporation is a means to grammatically
encode this connection, deriving identity from the part-of relation. self -incorporation achieves the
same results (structurally) that we would get from modifying self by means of the adjective entire
(as in his entire self, cf. (42d)).
(43) John admires himself.
≈ At a point t John admires the entire time slice of John at t.
6= John admires his former self (only).
6= John admires his good self (only). (but he may be unaware that he has another side)
Based on this discussion, I propose the LF requirement in (44). This interface requirement posits that
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self cannot remain unconstrained (referring to all or any parts of the host individual). It must either
be specified and thus constrained by means of an adjective, or else incorporate into the predicate
giving rise to an equally constrained identity interpretation. In other words, the idea is that it must
be made clear either by means of adjectival modification or by means of self -incorporation, which
part of an individual self is meant to select.
(44) Interface requirement on ‘self ’ (at the LF interface):
To guarantee successful communication, self cannot be unconstrained.
(i) Either a specific part of the host individual that self selects must be selected
by means of an adjective;
(ii) Or, as an alternative strategy, the meaning of a self -containing clause is disambiguated
by means of self -incorporation, which gives rise to the identity relation.
In the formal implementation, one may wonder why ız [z is a part of x] does not reduce to x
(thus resolving the underspecification without self -incorporation), given that the iota operator has
a maximalizing property. (This concern is similar to the concern addressed around examples (34)–
(35).) However, observe that even expressions such as the left part of my head are contextually
restricted in terms of their reference; e.g., if a speaker says that the left part of her head hurts, there
is no entailment that the entire left half of her head hurts (which would be the maximal left part of
her head). Moreover, it seems infelicitous (possibly due to scalar implicatures) to use concepts such
as part of, subset of, etc., to refer to something in its entirety; to illustrate, even though every set is
a subset of itself, it is generally deviant to refer to an entire set by means of the definite description
the subset (for instance, the brief conversation A: ‘Please draw a subset of set X.’ — B: ‘OK, I’ve
drawn the subset.’ would not make much sense if B simply redrew the original set X, which would
be the maximal subset of X).
The question at this point is whether this analysis overgenerates. Specifically, do we find cases
where self -incorporation occurs in the presence of an adjective, giving rise to Principle A effects (the
meaning of self in such constructions amounting to identity? The next section is concerned with
this question.19
3 The Syntactic Distribution of Principle A
3.1 Principle A as a Consequence of self -incorporation
In the section 1, we observed a correlation between the presence/absence of an adjective and the
absence/presence of Principle A. The data in section 1 highlighted the fact that in Greek and Kutchi
Gujarati unmodified self is always sensitive to Principle A, whereas modified self appears to be
exempt from it. In the remainder of this paper, I argue for a syntactic analysis of Principle A effects
involving self, which assumes that the anaphor covertly incorporates into the verb, as illustrated in
example (45) and motivated in section 2.3. As we have seen, a transitive verb that incorporates self
requires identity of subject and direct object (by means of the compositional semantics), thus giving
rise to Principle A.
(45) Costasi admires himselfi
LF: Costasi self-admires himselfi
19As a final remark, it is worth addressing Madame Tussaud sentences, as discussed by Jackendoff (1992). The
example in (i) in English (from Jackendoff 1992:4) has a reading in which it means that Ringo Starr (the actual
person) started undressing the statue of Ringo Starr.
(i) The other day I was strolling through the wax museum with Ringo Starr, and we came upon the statues of the
Beatles, and . . . . . . All of a sudden Ringo started undressing himself.
In Kutchi Gujarati, ena potha-ne does not appear to allow for such readings, though it has suggested by an anonymous
reviewer that they are possible in Modern Greek. More research is required to determine crosslinguistic empirical facts.
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An approach along these lines was first argued for by Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (1999) (based
on the Reinhart & Reuland 1993 system), and developed in Reuland & Winter (2009).20 self -
incorporation is generally viewed as the most economic way to encode binding dependencies (Reuland
& Winter 2009:75).21 I argued in section 2.3 that self -incorporation is actually due to an LF re-
striction that bans utterances with self from remaining unconstrained. Therefore, self -incorporation
is generally obligatory unless it is blocked by independent syntactic principles (e.g., the coordinate
structure constraint). In the latter case, we can assume that the configuration is still grammatical,
as the interface requirement against unconstrained self can be flouted as a last resort. This is
discussed in the following sections.
3.2 The Syntax of Anaphor Incorporation
Given that obligatory anaphor incorporation gives rise to Principle A effects, the question that re-
mains to be answered is, what bans modified self from incorporating into the predicate? If modified
self did incorporate, we would expect to see Principle A effects (and possibly a ban against modi-
fication with privative adjectives if incorporation is obligatory). This section aims to address these
issues. I argue in section 3.2.1 that incorporation of modified self is blocked by the adjective, as
incorporation across the adjective would violate independently motivated constraints that hold in
the narrow syntax.
3.2.1 The Absence of Principle A with Modified self
The main claim I wish to make here, is that the absence of Principle A with modified self can
be explained by locality; the presence of an adjective blocks self -incorporation due to Relativised
Minimality (Rizzi 1990), a constraint which states that if movement to a certain position targets an
element of a certain category (e.g., in the present case: a lexical head), then the closest appropriate
element must move. This is illustrated in (46).
(46) Relativised Minimality (based on Rizzi 1990)
a. possible movement:
Ytarget position [ Zelement of a different category from X [ Xelement to be moved
b. impossible movement:
Ytarget position [ Zelement of the same category as X [ Xelement to be moved
Let us assume that self -incorporation involves a configuration where the verb attracts a lexical head
(I assume that this is a generalized process that crosslinguistically underlies incorporation). In the
examples in (47), the closest lexical head c-commanded by the verb is not self but the adjective true
(this follows if the structure of a DP is [dp D [ap A [np N]]]). Given the definition of Relativised
20Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (1999) proposed this approach for Greek, arguing that Greek eafto ‘self’ incorporates
into the verb by covert head movement at LF. Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (1999) assume that head movement of
eafto ‘self’ leaves a trace, but do not provide an explicit semantic analysis. Reuland & Winter (2009), in their analysis
of English self, assume that incorporated self is only interpreted in its landing position.
21Reuland & Winter (2009) do not elaborate on the nature of this economy principle; the idea, as presented in
Reuland (2001, 2005), can be roughly summarized as follows. If the subject and object of a transitive verb are
coreferent, the object’s interpretation is dependent on that of the subject. This dependency, which is indicated by
the use of self, can be encoded computationally (i.e. syntax) by means of self -incorporation. Alternatively, it can
be resolved at the interface by means of computational semantics. Reuland’s general idea regarding economy is that
it is more economical to encode such an interpretive dependency in the syntax, making it ‘hard and fast’ (Reuland
2005). This makes self -incorporation obligatory unless it is blocked by syntactic constraints, which suspend this
economy principle. We can envisage this as follows. If self can incorporate, the competing derivation where it does
not incorporate is eliminated by economy, given the more economic derivation with self -incorporation. However, if
self cannot incorporate to begin with, no comparison between the two derivations will take place. See Reuland (2001,
2005, 2011) for further discussion.
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Minimality in (46), consequently in the Greek and Kutchi Gujarati examples in (47) the predicate
can only attract true and not self, for the adjective is closer. This means that self -incorporation is
blocked and in this sense, adjectives are interveners for self -incorporation.
(47) a. [I mitera tu Jannii] agapai [ton alithino eaftoi tu]. Greek
3.f.sg.nom mother Jannii.gen loves 3.m.sg.acc true selfi 3.m.sg.gen
‘Jannisi’s mother loves his true selfi.’
b. valjii-ni ma [e-na sacha pothai-ne] prem kar-e. KGu
Valjii-gen.f mother 3.sg-gen true selfi-acc love do-3.sg
‘Valjii’s mother loves his true selfi.’
The relevant configuration for relativised minimality is summarized in (48).
(48) V(attracts lexical head) . . . [ap true(lexical head) [np self(lexical head) ]]
The above proposal explains the correlation between the two selfs (modified vs. unmodified) and
Principle A, by highlighting that the core difference between them can be explained by locality.
However, it is not immediately clear why the determiner is not an intervener for head movement in
(3) and (4), repeated as (49) and (50) below. Greek has an overt determiner ton ‘the’. In Kutchi
Gujarati, I assume for now that the differential case marker –ne bears the properties of a determiner
(as it correlates with definiteness/specificity).
(49) a. O Costasi vlepi [ton eaftoi tu]. Greek
Costasi sees det.m.sg selfi.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costasi sees himselfi.’
b. *O Costasi xeri oti Maria vlepi [ton eaftoi tu]. Greek
Costasi knows that Maria sees det.m.sg self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costasi knows that Maria sees himselfi.’
(50) a. johni [e-na pothai-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Johni 3.sg-gen selfi-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Johni saw himselfi.’
b. *johni kidthu ke Maria [e-na pothai-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Johni said that Maria 3.sg-gen selfi-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Johni said that Maria saw himselfi.’
The difference between adjectives and determiners regarding their status as interveners can be
explained by the distinction between the two categories; Baker & Hale (1990) demonstrate that
lexical heads and functional heads must be treated as different categories by Relativised Minimality
(i.e. there is no uniform Head Movement Constraint). They argue that lexical heads are interveners
for lexical heads but not for functional heads and vice versa. An example of a lexical head (the noun
seuan ‘man’) incorporating into the verb across a functional head (the demonstrative determiner
yede ‘that’) is given in (51).
(51) a. [ Yede seuan-ide] a-mu-ban. Southern Tiwa
that man-suf 2sS/A-see-past
‘You saw that man.’
b. [dp Yede [np [n ti]]] a-seuani-mu-ban. Southern Tiwa
that 2sS-man-see-past
‘You saw that man.’ (Baker & Hale 1990:291, quoting Allen, Gardiner & Frantz 1984)
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Thus, a functional head such as a determiner (ton in (49)), is not an intervener for a lexical head,
such as the noun eafto ‘self’.22 Therefore, while in the examples in (47), self -movement is blocked
due to relativised minimality (given that true is also a lexical head), in (49) and (50), it is not. This
distribution is summarized in (52).
(52) a. * V(attracts lexical head) [ap true(lexical head) [np self(lexical head) ]] intervention
b. V(attracts lexical head) [dp the(functional head) [np self(lexical head) ]] no intervention
The above explanation, depicted in (52), assumes that incorporation of modified self cannot occur
due to processes in the narrow syntax; however, incorporation of unmodified self is acceptable, as
there is no relevant intervener. This derives the contrast between modified and unmodified self.
For completeness’ sake, it is worth pointing out that possessor DPs do not intervene with self -
incorporation either. It is plausible, as I have been assuming, that the possessor, tu in (53a) and
ena in (53b), though taking the shape of a genitive-marked DP, is truly a complement of self, given
that self is a relational noun. In Greek, it is likely that this complement is still in its base position,
whereas in Kutchi Gujarati, the possessor has moved (plausibly as an XP) to the specifier of the
DP to derive the surface order; therefore, neither can be an intervener. This is illustrated by the
bracketed structures in (53).
(53) a. O Costasi vlepi [ton eaftoi tu]. Greek
Costasi sees det.m.sg selfi.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen
‘Costasi sees himselfi.’
Costas [dp1 ton [np eafto [dp2 tu]]]
b. Costasi [e-na pothai-ne] jo-yo. KGu
Costasi 3.sg-gen selfi-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Costasi saw himselfi.’
Costas [specdp1[dp2 ena] [d′1 D [np potha-ne tena]]]
For Kutchi Gujarati, we can now give a complete illustration (54a+b), assuming that the differential
case marker –ne is located in D23 (which is head-final). This contrasts with (55a+b), where self -
incorporation is blocked by the presence of the adjective mota ‘big’.24
(54) a. john e-na potha-ne jo-yo. KGu
John 3.sg-gen self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘John saw himself.’
22Note (although not relevant here), a lexical head is not an intervener for incorporation of a functional head either;
cf. Baker & Hale (1990) for examples.
23The structures for Greek are analogous except for the difference in headedness (Greek being head-initial), and
the fact that the genitive noun phrase does not move into SpecDP.
24Strike through marks unpronounced copies in these trees.
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b. vP
NP
John VP v
DP V
DP D′ N V
potha joyo
ena NP D
-ne ←− no intervener (functional head)
DP N
potha
ena
(55) a. john e-na mota potha-ne jo-yo KGu
John 3.sg-gen big self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘John saw his fat self.’
b. vP
NP
John VP v
DP V
DP D′ N V
*potha joyo
ena AP D
-ne
A NP
intervener present −→ mota
(lexical head) DP N
potha
ena
4 Old Puzzles Revisited: Unbound Possessors in Greek
Greek allows for cases where the possessor of eafto ‘self’ is truly unbound (i.e. where it does not
co-vary with any other expression in the clause). This is illustrated in (56). (Anagnostopoulou &
Everaert call this the reified substantive reading of eafto, a term that I do not adopt). The possibility
of such an unbound possessor (here: tis Marias ‘of Mary’) actually follows from my analysis whenever
self -incorporation is blocked. In (56) the resulting meaning is that only Jannis knows the unique
individual that is a part of Maria’s and that is good.
(56) O Jannis xeri mono ton kalo eafto tis Marias
Jannis.nom knows only the good self.acc Maria.gen
‘Jannis only knows Maria’s good self’ (Anagnostopoulou & Everaert 1999:103)
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5 Introducing A New Puzzle: Possessive Reflexives & Alienability
Kutchi Gujarati possessive pronouns seem to be subject to Binding Principles, illustrated by the
examples in (57). If a possessor is c-commanded by a local antecedent, it must contain the reflexive
potha ‘self’, giving rise to Principle A and B effects.
(57) a. valjii [e-nak/#i mota kutra] jo-ya. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen.pl big.pl dog.pl see-pfv.pl
‘Valjii saw hisk/#i(#own) big dogs.’
b. valjii [[e-na potha-na]i/#k mota kutra] jo-ya. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen.pl self.pl-gen.pl big.pl dog.pl see-pfv.pl
‘Valjii saw hisi/#k own big dogs.’
However, in this case, the presence of Principle A in possessive reflexive constructions cannot be
due to self -incorporation, for if we were to force self -incorporation in (57), then we would derive a
meaning that does not correspond to the meaning of the utterance, suggesting that self -incorporation
cannot take place in the case of possessive reflexives. One could argue that the genitive possessor
is located in the SpecDP of the DP that it modifies; the consequence of such an assumption is
that incorporation is blocked by the same principle that gives rise to the Condition on Extraction
Domains (ced), Huang (1982). The relevant generalization is that we can extract from complement
positions, but not from specifier positions;25 although we see Principle A effects, the possessive
reflexive constructions show that incorporation of the anaphor is blocked by independent syntactic
principles, in this case the ced, illustrated in (58).
(58) a. #johnk [[e-na potha-no]k kutro] potha-jo-yo. KGu
John 3.sg-gen self-gen.m dog.m.sg self-see-pfv.m.sg
‘John self-saw his dog.’
b. vP
NP
John VP v
DP V
DP N V
*potha joyo
NP D NP D
-no -ne
DP N kutro
potha ruled out by the ced
eno (no extraction from within specifier positions)
Given that reflexive possessors cannot undergo self -incorporation, the question naturally emerges
how Principle A applies to possessors. First of all, there is evidence that Principle A effects are rather
limited in the case of possessive reflexives, as we can have genitive-marked (unmodified) potha in
25
(i) Extraction from a complement position
a. I met [a woman from England].
b. Who did you meet [t from England]?
(ii) Extraction from a specifier position
c. *I read [a woman from England]’s article on China.
d. *Who did you read [t from England]’s article on China?
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the possessor position of subject DPs. So, possessive potha does not seem to require an antecedent
outside the DP in any case. Then why do Principle A effects like in (57) occur?
(59) a. ama-ro potha-no kutro aav-yo. KGu
2.sg-gen self-gen.m dog.m.sg come-pfv.m.sg
‘Our (own) dog came.’ (literally ‘Our self’s dog came.’)
b. john-nu potha-nu ghar bari g-yu. KGu
John-gen.n self-gen.n house burn went-pfv.n.sg
‘John’s (own) house burned down.’ (literally ‘John’s self’s house burned down.’)
c. e-nu potha-nu ghar bari g-yu. KGu
3.sg-gen.n self-gen.n house burn went-pfv.n.sg
‘His/Her (own) house burned down.’ (literally ‘His / Her self’s house burned down.’)
The following facts suggest that the necessity (and possibility) of potha inside possessors (cf. (59))
might be linked to alienable/inalienable possession, and it might be of a semantic nature. First, in
cases of inalienable possession (e.g., kinship terms, body parts and properties), potha is optional.
This is illustrated by the data in (60).
(60) a. john e-ni (potha-ni) ben-ne jo-yi. KGu
John 3.sg-gen.f self-gen.f sister-acc see-pfv.f.sg
‘John saw his own sister.’
b. john e-no (potha-no) hath-ne upar-yo. KGu
John 3.sg-gen self-gen.m arm-acc raise-pfv.m.sg
‘John raised his (own) arm.’
c. john e-na (potha-na) vaar-ne ketch-ya. KGu
John 3.sg-gen self-gen hair-acc pull-pfv.pl
‘John pulled his (own) hair.’
d. john e-ni (potha-ni) aakhi-ne bandth kar-i. KGu
John 3.sg-gen.f self-gen.f eyes-acc close do-pfv.f.sg
‘John closed his (own) eyes.’
e. john e-ni (potha-ni) uchai maapi. KGu
John 3.sg-gen.f self-gen.f height measured
‘John measured his (own) height.’
The data in (60) contrast with (61), where potha is necessary.
(61) a. john e-no *(potha-no) kutro jo-yo. KGu
John 3.sg-gen.m self-gen.m dog.m.sg see-pfv.m.sg
‘John saw his own dog.’
b. john e-nu *(potha-nu) ghar jo-yu. KGu
John 3.sg-gen.n self-gen.n house see-pfv.n.sg
‘John saw his own house’.
c. john e-ni *(potha-ni) gaadi jo-yi. KGu
John 3.sg-gen.f self-gen.f car see-pfv.f.sg
‘John saw his own car.’
d. john e-ni *(potha-ni) chopri jo-yi. KGu
John 3.sg.f-gen.f self-gen book see-pfv.f.sg
‘John saw his own book.’
Finally, the examples of a reflexive object in (62a) does not even allow for potha inside the possessor
of the argument ena potha-ne, cf. (62b), and thus contrasts with (59) above.
(62) a. valjii [e-na mota potha-ne]i jo-yo. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen big self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Valji saw his fat self.’
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b. *valjii [[e-na potha-na] mota potha-ne]i jo-yo. KGu
Valji 3.sg-gen self-gen big self-acc see-pfv.m.sg
‘Valji saw his fat self.’
The data in this section seem to suggest that potha in possessor position is required to mark co-
reference between the possessor and a local antecedent if the possessive relation is alienable, whereas
it is optional if this relation is inalienable. It seems as though potha in these constructions (or perhaps
it is the constructions themselves), cannot be compared to the cases discussed in the main sections
of this paper. It follows that in possessive reflexive constructions, any Principle A and B effects that
we observe are plausibly semantic in nature, for alienability is a semantic property of a possessive
relation. The observations discussed in this section extend beyond the scope of this project, and I
leave them open for future research.
6 Extending the Analysis
As shown before, I derive Principle A effects from self -incorporation. In this section, I discuss another
case where the reflexive and its antecedent are not co-arguments (i.e. arguments of the same verb);
however, this time, this cases patterns like those in the main sections. The case I am referring to is
exceptional case marking (ecm) in Greek and Kutchi Gujarati. ecm constructions are problematic
for a view where Principle A is derived by self -incorporation or other mechanisms of subject-object
identification, such as Reinhart & Reuland (1993). In the case of ecm constructions containing an
anaphor, Principle A effects arise. Given that self and its antecedent do not belong to the same
predicate, self -incorporation alone will not do, and an alternative must be pursued.
6.1 ecm Constructions in Greek and Kutchi Gujarati
The examples in (63) and (64) are ecm constructions in Kutchi Gujarati and Greek respectively.26
The example in (65) illustrates acceptable ecm clauses containing an anaphor.
(63) a. valji-ne reena-ne dablu mar-va-nu khaptu tu. KGu
Valji-dat Reena-acc container.n.sg hit-inf-gen.n want aux
‘Valji wanted Reena to hit the container.’
b. valji-ne reena-ne sui ja-va-nu khaptu tu. KGu
Valji-dat Reena-acc sleep go-inf-gen.n want aux
‘Valji wanted Reena to go to sleep.’
(64) a. O Yiorghos perimene tin Maria na grapsi asxima sto djagonisma. Greek
the Jorghos expected the.acc Maria subj write badly in.the exam
‘Jorghos expected Maria to do badly in the exam.’
b. O Yiorghos ithele tin Maria na grapsi asxima sto djagonisma. Greek
the Jorghos wanted the.acc Maria subj write badly in.the exam
‘Jorghos wanted Maria to do badly in the exam.’
26For Greek ecm, see Schneider-Zioga (1992) and Kotzoglu (2002). The Kutchi Gujarati examples below indicate
that we are dealing with ecm in (63). Example (i) shows that the accusative-marked argument can be an expletive
with an associate that’s an argument of the embedded clause (it . . . that John will come).
(i) valji-ne aa-ne kevai ja-va-nu khaptu tu ke John av-se. KGu
Valji-dat that-acc said go-inf-gen.n want aux that John come-fut
‘Valji wanted it to be said that John will come.’
Example (ii) shows that the accusative-marked argument can be part of an idiom in the embedded clause.
(ii) valji-ne tari jeeb-ne kap-vai ja-va-nu khaptu tu. KGu
Valji-dat your tongue-acc cut-pass go-inf-gen.n want aux
‘Valji wanted you to shut up.’
This indicates that the accusative-marked argument (while plausibly receiving accusative case from the matrix clause)
is an embedded subject, i.e. we are not dealing with a control construction (or with a construction where the embedded
clause has a pro subject).
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(65) a. valji-ne e-na potha-ne sui ja-va-nu khaptu tu. KGu
Valji-dat 3.sg-gen self-acc sleep go-inf-gen.n want aux
‘Valji wanted himself to go to sleep (. . . but he found it hard to stop watching TV).’
b. O Yiorghos perimene ton eafto tu na grapsi asxima
the Jorghos expected the.acc self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen subj write badly
sto djagonisma. Greek
in.the exam
‘Jorghos expected himself to do badly in the exam’ (ton eafto tu needs to be focused)
c. ?O Yiorghos ithele ton eafto tu na grapsi asxima
the Jorghos wanted the.acc self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen subj write badly
sto djagonisma. Greek
in.the exam
‘Jorghos wanted himself to do badly in the exam.’
The problem is, that such constructions also exhibit Principle A effects of the same type as we find
in matrix clauses. The examples in (66) show that Principle A effects surface with unmodified self,
whereas the data in (67) show its absence with modified self. This is the same observation that has
been illustrated throughout this paper.
(66) a. *valji kidthu ke reena-ne e-na potha-ne sui ja-va-nu khaptu tu. KGu
Valji said that Reena-acc 3.sg-gen self-acc sleep go-inf-gen.n want aux
‘Valji said that Reena wanted himself (Valji) to go to sleep.’
b. *O Yiorghos xeri oti i Maria perimene ton eafto tu na grapsi
Jorghos knows that Maria expected the self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen subj write
asxima sto djagonisma. Greek
badly in.the exam
‘Jorghos knows that Maria expected himself(=Jorghos) to do badly in the exam.’
(67) a. valji kidthu ke reena-ne e-na bimar potha-ne sui ja-va-nu khaptu
Valji said that Reena-acc 3.sg-gen sick self-acc sleep go-inf-gen. n want
tu. KGu
aux
‘Valji said that Reena wanted his sick self (Valji’s sick self) to go to sleep.’
b. ?O Yiorghos xeri oti i Maria perimene ton aksiolipito eafto tu na
Jorghos knows that Maria expected the pitiful self.m.sg 3.m.sg.gen subj
grapsi asxima sto djagonisma. Greek
write badly in.the exam
‘Jorghos knows that Maria expected his pitiful self to do badly in the exam.’
The pattern in (66)–(67) is not predicted from this analysis. Given that we see Principle A effects,
we would expect self -incorporation; however in ecm clauses this may appear not to be possible,
for the anaphor and its referent are arguments of different verbs (the anaphor is the subject of
the embedded clause, its antecedent is the subject of the matrix clause). Thus, it is initially not
clear how self -incorporation could apply. We may expect (66) to be good, as self -incorporation
should be blocked anyway. Assuming that self cannot incorporate into the matrix predicate it is not
immediately obvious why there are Principle A effects in ecm constructions, as the analysis predicts
its absence.
At this point, there are two possible solutions to this puzzle. Either Principle A in ecm con-
structions is a completely different phenomenon from Principle A in non-ecm clauses, or self -
incorporation into the matrix predicate can occur in ecm clauses. I have argued for the former
in the case of possessive reflexives, which do indeed look rather different from regular reflexives.
However, in the case of ecm predicates, this does not seem motivated, as they are parallel to matrix
predicates. Therefore, I thus pursue the second option.
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As Bu¨ring (2005:229) argues, ecm clauses appear to behave as though the embedded subject did
also count as an object argument for the matrix predicate. Such a view has been substantiated by
Bruening (2001), based on Pasamaquoddy facts.27 The idea is that ecm really involves Raising-to-
Object, i.e. the embedded clause expresses a property (type <e,<s,t>>). I adopt his entry for ‘know’
to Kutchi Gujarati and Greek.
(68) a. ||perimene/expected||w = λP<e,<s,t>>.λx.λy.for all w’ compatible with what y expected
in w, P(x)(w’)
b. ||ithele/khaptu/wanted||w = λP<e,<s,t>>.λx.λy.for all w’ compatible with what y wanted
in w, P(x)(w’)
Without self -incorporation, we derive the truth conditions in (69b) from the above lexical en-
tries (based on the structure in (69b)). We might now propose that potha once again incorpo-
rates into khaptu ‘want’ (leaving open the details of such an approach). The problem is, how potha
‘self’ (being of type <e,<e,t>) could compositionally combine with khaptu ‘want’ (being of type
<<e,<s,t>>,<e,<e,t>>), as is illustrated by the diagram in (69b). Compositionally, there is no
real issue for the semantic component, if we assume an alternative syntactic structure along the
lines of Larsonian VP shells. The precise evidence for VP shell structures in Kutchi Gujarati and
Greek exceeds the scope of this paper, and I leave it open for further research.
(69) a. valji-ne e-na potha-ne sui ja-va-nu khaptu tu. KGu
Valji-dat 3.sg-gen self-acc sleep go-inf-gen.n want aux
‘Valji wanted himself to go to sleep (. . . but he found it hard to stop watching TV).’
b. ||CP|| = 1 iff for all w’ compatible with what Valji wanted in w*,
the unique salient part of Valji in w* was going to sleep.
valji-nee VP
DPe
ena potha-ne
IP<e,<s,t>> khaptu<<e,<s,t>,<e,<e,t>>>
sui javanu
7 Conclusion
The presence or absence of Principle A of the Binding Theory can be explained by a requirement at
the syntax semantics interface. Principle A effects surface in the presence of unmodified self, where
there is a requirement for the subject and object to be identical; this requirement triggers self -
incorporation into the predicate. In contrast, modified self -incorporation is blocked in the syntax,
giving rise to an asymmetric part-of relation. Given that self -incorporation is absent, we predict
that Principle A effects do not surface, and this is exactly what we find.
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